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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY  
Over the last few years the policy debate in the UK has focused on the key role educational 
aspirations can play in closing the socio-economic gradient in educational outcomes. The 
argument has been that students coming from less advantaged background lag behind their 
more advantaged peers because they lack aspirations. 
Empirical evidence so far has primarily focused on the role played by aspirations in 
affecting educational outcomes such as school retention after compulsory education or test 
scores. Holding high educational aspirations is negatively associated with undesirable 
outcomes such as engagement in risky and anti-social behaviours, lone parenthood among 
female teenagers and future benefit receipt.  
In this study we fill a gap in the literature examining key determinants of aspirations for 
higher education using UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS) data on English and 
Welsh 10 to 15 year olds. In particular we look at how paternal education, maternal 
education and paternal labour earnings affect students’ aspirations to go to university. We 
evaluate the role of parental education and income simultaneously because we want to 
understand how they contribute to the formation of aspirations for higher education. We 
argue that parental education represents the home learning environment and as such 
constitutes a long-term endowment in the formation of aspirations for higher education. 
Paternal income, on the other hand can be subject to fluctuations and as such represents a 
contingent endowment.  
Our evidence suggests that family endowments that affect children’s home learning 
environment in the long run are more important in the formation of aspirations for higher 
education than short term financial constraints. If policy makers believe that closing the 
socio-economic gradient in aspirations for higher education can reduce the socio-economic 
gradient in higher education participation, then targeting the home learning environment, 
especially by means of early interventions to keep educational aspirations high amongst less 
advantaged students, might be more effective that providing financial aid at the point of 
entry to higher education when less advantaged students have fallen too much behind in 
terms of their aspirations to catch up with their advantaged peers. 
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Abstract 
We evaluate the impact of parental education and household income on 10 to 15 year olds’ 
aspirations for higher education. OLS estimates reveal no maternal education effects but 
positive paternal education and household income effects. IV estimates of the model, which 
simultaneously account for endogeneity in parental education and household income, find no 
significant effects of household income on children’s aspirations for higher education but 
positive, even though very imprecisely identified, paternal education effects.  
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1. Introduction 
In 2010 the National Equality Panel
1
 produced a thorough report on Britain looking at 
a number of relevant economic outcomes (such as education, employment and 
earnings) and focusing on how income inequality affects individuals differently 
depending on factors like gender, age, ethnicity and socio-economic class. According 
to the report, differences in socio-economic background are evident since early 
childhood, they become more pronounced over the life course and tend to be passed 
through generations contributing to the persistence of income inequality. In response 
to this evidence, the British Government declared its commitment to make sure that 
socio-economic background or any other relevant factors, including gender, age and 
ethnicity, would not undermine the ability of individuals to realise their aspirations 
(Government Equalities Office, 2010). The role young people’s aspirations can have 
in raising educational attainment has been a central part of the UK policy debate 
(Cabinet Office 2011), and understanding how young people’s aspirations are formed 
and why they differ by socioeconomic background is essential to provide indications 
to policy makers. For example, it is not entirely clear whether limited financial 
capabilities at the point of entry to higher education frustrate young people’s 
educational aspirations or if young people living in poorer households lag behind 
their more affluent peers in terms of their educational aspirations to start with.  
According to Hills et al. (2010) children receiving free school meals (FSM)
2
, 
systematically attain lower scores at school throughout compulsory education when 
compared to their non-eligible peers. These differences consistently grow throughout 
                                                          
1
 The National Equality Panel, chaired by Professor John Hills, consisted of academic experts whose 
goal was to provide the Government with an analysis of inequality in Britain by the end of 2009 
(http://sta.geo.useconnect.co.uk/national_equality_panel/publications.aspx). 
2 
Free school meals are available only to children from low income families and for this reason receipt 
of FSMs is often used to identify students coming from less affluent households. According to Hobbs 
and Vignoles (2007), FSM eligibility is an imperfect proxy for low income family; hence the 
proportion of students from households facing financial difficulties might be underestimated when 
relying only on this indicator. 
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primary and secondary school and are very large at the point of entry to higher 
education. Even though previous school attainment is the main factor influencing 
GCSEs
3 
performance at age 16 by socio-economic status, other factors related to 
family background and students’ educational aspirations and attitudes still play an 
important role (Goodman et al. 2010; Chowdry et al. 2011). 
Aspirations for higher education are positively associated with educational 
attainment, although establishing a causal relationship between them has not been 
possible so far (Feliciano and Rumbaut 2005; Jacob and Wilder 2010). Even if high 
aspirations do not turn into positive educational outcomes, they are thought to reduce 
engagement in deviant and antisocial behaviours and appear to be inversely related to 
later life outcomes such as benefit receipt and early and lone parenthood among 
women (Hirschi 1969; Torstensen 1990; Plotnick 1992; Leblanc 1994; Moore et al. 
1995; Edwards et al. 2001). According to the evidence in Gregg and Washbrook 
(2010), aspirations for higher education are socially graded, which implies that 
children from less affluent families generally have lower educational aspirations than 
their more affluent peers and are at a greater risk to display undesirable behaviours 
both as teenagers and as adults. Hence, even if coming from a less advantaged family 
background can pose barriers to the realisation of young people’s aspirations, the real 
issue is that children coming from less privileged family backgrounds are more likely 
to have lower aspirations to start with. 
In this paper we focus on the role of parental education and parental income in 
shaping children’s aspirations for higher education. Parental education is able to 
capture long-term time-invariant effects (i.e. home learning environment, motivation 
                                                          
3
 The General Certificates for Secondary Education (GCSEs) are the academic qualifications awarded 
in England and Wales at the end of compulsory education when students are 16 years old. The exams 
are taken in a number of different subjects when students are between age 14 and 16. Attaining five 
GCSEs of grade A/A*-C is the minimum governmental requirement and is perceived as a key indicator 
of academic ability. 
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and attitudes) on children’s aspirations for higher education. Parental income, 
conversely, tends to be time varying and should provide information about the 
relevance of potential short-term financial constraints on children’s aspirations for 
higher education. Assessing the causal and simultaneous effects of these inputs on 
aspirations for higher education can provide important information to policy makers. 
For example if children’s aspirations for higher education are more sensitive to 
shocks to parental income than to parental education, then a transfer to alleviate 
financial constraints can in principle attenuate the socioeconomic gap in educational 
aspirations and eventually the socioeconomic gap in educational attainment. If, on the 
other hand, differences in aspirations for higher education were mainly driven by 
differences in parental education, then early interventions at the family level would be 
more appropriate.  
Our main contribution to the literature on educational aspirations is to address the 
potential endogeneity and evaluate the causal impact of parental education and family 
income on children’s aspirations for higher education. Following Chevalier et al. 
(2013) we estimate the simultaneous causal effect of parental education as well as 
household income on children’s aspirations for higher education relying on a set of 
exogenous variations in these important determinants of family background. For this 
scope we select a number of instruments. Following Crawford et al. (2013) we exploit 
the exogenous variation in parental education brought about by their month of birth; 
while household income is instrumented by father’s union membership status and by 
father’s occupation-union interactions as in Shea (2000) and Chevalier et al. (2013). 
OLS estimates reveal no maternal education effects but positive paternal education 
and household income effects. IV estimates of the model, which simultaneously 
account for endogeneity in parental education and household income, find no 
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significant effects of household income on children’s aspirations for higher education 
but positive, even though very imprecisely identified, paternal education effects. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. First, we discuss the literature on the 
role of parental education and household income on children’s educational outcomes, 
the issues posed by endogeneity and our strategy to address them. Next, we introduce 
the data used for our analysis, the UK Household Longitudinal Survey, and the 
relations between our variables of interest. Section 3.4 describes the estimation 
procedure adopted and the estimated model specification, while results are discussed 
in section 3.5. Finally, we offer some concluding remarks.     
2. Literature review 
Traditionally, economists attributed socio-economic differences in human capital 
accumulation to families’ inability to finance the best investments in human capital 
for their children due to imperfect capital markets. According to the theory of human 
capital, parents who cannot afford the optimal level of investment in their children’s 
human capital (e.g. education, health, etc.) are not able to borrow financial resources 
using their children’s future earnings as a collateral, and for this reason students 
living in less affluent households do not have access to optimal investments in 
education (Becker and Tomes, 1994). These theories encouraged governments to 
think that relaxing the financial constraints of poorer families was the way to go in 
order to reduce the strong and persistent under-investments in education of children 
coming from deprived households. A copious literature on the role of parental income 
on children’s educational attainment provides mixed evidence in this regard. For 
instance, in Maurin (2002) parental income is found to play an important role in 
determining the probability of a child to be held back in elementary school in France 
advocating the need for more generous income transfers to alleviate poor families’ 
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financial constraints. On the other hand, Chevalier and Lanot (2002) simulate an 
income transfer, holding family characteristics fixed, and find that family 
characteristics effects dominate income effects in determining the probability of 
staying in school after turning 16 in the UK. 
The academic disadvantage of children living in low-income households is evident 
from the very beginning of a student’s schooling career and the trend in this 
disadvantage is not constant but grows as the child proceeds to higher educational 
levels. At the point of entry to higher education this accumulated disadvantage forces 
poorer students out of the higher education arena, reinforcing stagnation in social 
mobility (Hills et al. 2010; Chowdry et al. 2013). These trends in the socioeconomic 
gradient of educational outcomes, paired with mixed empirical evidence on the role 
of income in explaining them, challenged researchers to provide policy makers with 
correct insights on the first order factors accounting for the observed income-based 
inequality in education.  
Carneiro and Heckman (2002; 2003) revisit the credit constraint explanation and 
posit the existence of two types of credit constraints: long-term, due to time invariant 
household characteristics, such as parental education, and short-term, due to 
temporary changes in household characteristics, such as shocks to family income. In 
their work they emphasise the importance of establishing the existence of causality 
between educational outcomes and their determinants to provide solid guidance for 
policy makers. According to their findings, US college participation is not so strongly 
affected by parental income once long-term family factors, such as students’ ability 
and family background, are taken into account. They point out that human capital 
accumulation is a dynamic process which takes place over the life course and where 
the home learning environment provided by parents and their financial capability 
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throughout the lives of their offsprings play a more important role than the credit 
constraints families may face when their children decide whether to enrol in college. 
Students enter the educational system with a set of cognitive and non-cognitive skills 
they develop within their family over the early years of childhood. Less affluent 
parents are disadvantaged both in terms of their own skill endowments and their 
financial capabilities and are not always able to provide their offsprings with an ideal 
home learning environment.  Children living in low-income households enter school 
with an initial skill disadvantage, which proves difficult to overcome and for this 
reason differences in educational attainment by income levels persist over schooling 
years (Dickson et al. 2013). Carneiro and Heckman (2002; 2003) recommend that 
governments design policies to foster the development of cognitive skills within the 
family environment during early childhood and promote the improvement of more 
malleable non-cognitive skills later on in life. Based on their evidence, only 8% of 
students in the US are subject to liquidity constraints at the point of entry to college, 
while students coming from the least advantaged background do not even make it this 
far in the educational system. All this poses serious doubts on the effectiveness of 
tuition policies in reducing the socioeconomic gradient in higher education 
participation.  
As a result of these findings a number of studies focused on establishing causal 
links between parental income or parental education and children’s educational 
outcomes.  These generally focus either on establishing causal relations between 
parental education and child’s education and/or earnings or parental income and 
child’s education and/or earnings. 
Chevalier et al. (2013) has been the only study trying to adopt a simultaneous 
causal approach to evaluate the effect of both parental education and income on 
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children’s probability to stay in education after age 16. They use UK Labour force 
Survey (LFS) data from 1992 to 2012 to evaluate the simultaneous causal impact of 
paternal education, maternal education and paternal labour earnings separately for 
boys and girls. They adopt an instrumental variable approach where they exploit the 
raise in the minimum school living age (RoSLA) in England and Wales, which 
affected individuals born after September 1957, and parental month of birth as 
exogenous sources of variation in parental education, and, in addition to this, paternal 
occupation-specific union membership premia to simulate shocks in household 
income. Contrary to what a standard OLS approach reveals, short-term financial 
constraints play a very marginal role as opposed to long-term resources, proxied by 
parental education, in students’ decision to stay in education after age 16.  
So far the literature on aspirations for higher education has focused on 
understanding the role of aspirations on outcomes (Feliciano and Rumbaut 2005; 
Jacob and Wilder 2010). In addition to this, those studies, which set to unravel the 
mechanisms behind the formation of young people’s educational aspirations have 
never addressed this issue from a causal perspective (Kao and Tienda 1998; Akerman 
and Gutman 2008). Following Chevalier et al. (2013) we try to disentangle the 
parental education effect and the household income effect and distinguish between 
the role of permanent parental human capital endowments and the role of contingent 
financial capabilities in the formation of aspirations for higher education of 10 to 15 
year old English and Welsh students.  
Differently from Chevalier et al. (2013) we focus our analysis on young people’s 
aspirations for higher education rather than cognitive outcomes such as post-
compulsory schooling participation. We believe acquiring insights on aspirations is 
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particularly relevant for the age group we analyse.
4
 Policy initiatives aimed at 
reducing the socioeconomic gradient in actual attainment and cognitive abilities lose 
their scope as children grow up; in fact by age 8 cognitive skills tend to be stable and 
cannot be easily modified (Carneiro and Heckman 2003). For this reason, school-
based programmes targeted at less advantaged students, such as Big Brothers/ Big 
Sisters (BB/BS)
5
 in the US or Aimhigher
6
 in the UK, focus on the awareness, 
motivation and engagement of these students, rather than on standard educational 
outcomes, and are found to deter adolescents’ involvement in risky and anti-social 
behaviours, to promote self-efficacy at school and aspirations for post compulsory 
education, and ultimately to improve test scores (Tierney and Grossman 1995; 
Emmerson et al. 2006).   
In addition to this, the data source we use allows us to take into account important 
factors for educational aspiration formation such as child’s ethnicity and number of 
siblings. Furthermore, linkage to administrative data through secure data access will 
be possible for some respondents, and this will provide us with information on the 
academic ability of children. The data has not yet been released but we consider it 
important for an updated version of this work since educational aspirations are 
strongly related to previous academic attainment (Akerman and Gutman 2008).  
                                                          
4
 The findings in Chevalier et al. (2013) are based on a sample of 16 to 18 year old respondents. 
5
 BB/BS is a school-based mentoring programme (which used to be community-based), in place in the 
USA since 1904 that matches adults with young people on a one-to-one basis. Students are referred to 
the programme by their own school and are paired with an adult volunteer mentor. Big brothers/sisters 
meet with their Small brothers/sisters for a few hours per week on a regular basis and the objective of 
the programme is to provide young students coming from single-parent families or particularly 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods with and adult friend they can relate to as a role model. 
6
 Aimhigher is a school-based programme, in place in England between 2004 and 2011, to promote 
higher education among students from disadvantaged backgrounds who lived in areas of relative 
deprivation where participation in higher education is low. The programme consists of a range of 
activities to raise awareness, motivation, engagement and aspirations of students, and provides 
advice and guidance to teachers and families to encourage participation in higher education for 
traditionally under-represented groups.  
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Our specification allows for differences in parental contribution by parental 
gender. We estimate paternal and maternal education contributions separately to 
understand whether children’s aspirations for higher education tend to be more 
responsive to either their father’s or mother’s education. We think it is relevant to 
distinguish between paternal and maternal contribution to the formation of children’s 
educational aspirations since men and women tend to play different roles within the 
family. If paternal school attainment works as a good proxy for family wealth, we 
consider maternal education as being particularly relevant to the home learning 
environment since mothers predominantly take up the role of carers within the 
household. Educated mothers, who are more likely to work, spend the same amount 
of time with their children as less educated mothers at the cost of their leisure time 
(Blau and Currie (2003). Moreover, their education allows them to provide a more 
stimulating home learning environment to their offsprings which has a positive 
impact on their children’s educational attainment and behaviours and this effect is 
found to persist into adolescence reducing teenage pregnancies and criminal 
convictions (Carneiro et al. 2013; Canova and Vaglio 2010). Unfortunately, due to 
sample size issues, we are not able to obtain separate results by child’s gender and 
hence will not be able to assess whether daughters’ aspirations are relatively more 
sensitive than sons’ to either their mother’s or father’s education. 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
We investigate the role of parental education and household income on children’s 
aspirations for higher education using data from the UK Household Longitudinal 
Study (UKHLS). This is a panel survey which was initiated in 2009 and collects 
relevant information on social and economic circumstances and attitudes. A 
representative sample of 100,000 UK individuals from 40,000 households is 
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interviewed every 12 months. Starting from wave 2, respondents of the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) were incorporated in the UKHLS. All individuals 
aged 16 and above are interviewed as part of the main survey. Young individuals 
between the age of 10 and 15 fill in a self-completion questionnaire which collects 
information on a range of relevant aspects of their lives such as, for example, 
ethnicity, health and health-related behaviours, subjective wellbeing, their 
relationship with their family and peers and aspirations and attitudes towards 
education and school. Data on young people constitute a rotating panel: once 
members of the youth panel turn 16 they become part of the adult panel and are 
replaced by children turning 10 on the same year. Young respondents’ family and 
household background characteristics can be obtained matching children to their 
parents who are interviewed in the main survey.  
The UKHLS provides relevant information on numerous life factors and it is also 
possible to link the survey respondents to rich administrative datasets. Among these, 
data linkage to the National Pupil Database (NPD), which contains information on 
test and exam results of students in schools and colleges in England, will be available 
through secure access for respondents who authorised it. This feature of UKHLS will 
allow users to access data on educational attainment prior age 16. This information is 
particularly important to answer our research question for two reasons: first, we are 
using cross-sectional data and are not able to capture time-invariant academic ability 
otherwise; second, prior school attainment is an important determinant of educational 
aspirations (Gutman and Akerman 2008; Chowdry et al. 2010). 
3.1 Sample selection 
Since we do not observe much variation in household income over the three waves, 
we decided to analyse our data as cross-section data and we only keep the first 
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observation of 10 to 15 year old children answering the question on aspirations for 
higher education.
7
 For this reason our sample consists of very young children, in fact 
30% of it is composed by 10 year old respondents, whereas a proportion ranging 
between 12% and 14% is evenly distributed among remaining age groups. We 
speculate that younger children’s aspirations for higher education might be more 
strongly influenced by their family background since students adjust their aspirations 
according to information based on test results which they acquire as they progress in 
the educational system (Akerman and Gutman 2008). In order to verify that our 
results are not completely driven by the age composition in our sample we replicate 
the same models using the last available observation of those children who reported 
aspirations for higher education. This alternative sample inevitably has a greater 
proportion of 15 year olds.
8
  
We base our analysis only on England and Wales residents since the Scottish and 
Northern-Irish educational systems differ from the one in place in England and Wales 
and this could affect our results.
 9
 Similarly we are excluding non-UK-born parents 
since they might have attended school abroad and might as well be disadvantaged in 
                                                          
7
 We estimate a further specification where we pool together all individual observations and treat 
them as non-repeated observations clustering at the family level. For this specification we include 
children’s age dummies and observations from the minority ethnic boost. Results are not 
substantially different from the ones presented in our preferred specification and are available from 
the author upon request. 
8
 OLS estimates for this sample produce slightly bigger coefficients for both paternal education and 
household income. Moreover, maternal education has a positive and significant effect as long as 
father’s occupation is not accounted for in the model. However, the second stage IV estimates are 
not different from the ones of our preferred sample. Results are available from the author upon 
request. 
9
 In the Northern Irish school system the academic year runs from the 1
st
 July of year t to the end of 
June of year t+1 and children start primary school on the academic year they turn 5 years old. In the 
Scottish educational system children turning 4 years old between September and December of year t 
and January and February of year t+1 can access the first year of primary school in August of year t+1. 
In addition to this, university tuition policies for undergraduate studies vary significantly between 
these countries. Since 2012 universities can charge up to £9,000 per year in England and Wales and 
up to £3,575 per year in Northern Ireland. University tuitions are free in Scotland; however English, 
Welsh and Northern Irish students studying in Scotland are liable to pay higher education fees. Finally 
an undergraduate degree lasts 3 years in these countries except from Scotland where it lasts 4 years.  
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terms of knowledge about the educational system in their country of residence. We 
are interested in assessing how both paternal and maternal education contribute to the 
formation of child’s aspirations for higher education and for this reason we exclude 
single parent households from the analysis
10
. Even if we had information on non-
resident parents, something we often do not have, it would still be challenging to 
assess their educational contribution to children’s aspirations for higher education. 
Children whose fathers are self-employed are not part of our sample because self-
employed workers might constitute a selected group of individuals with unobserved 
characteristics that could influence their children’s aspirations for higher education 
and that might have influenced their educational choices too. Finally, we trim paternal 
income from labour to avoid outliers and exclude all families reporting income above 
the 95
th
 percentile and below the 1
st
 percentile. We are less restrictive at the bottom of 
the income distribution because we are particularly interested in assessing parental 
education and household income effects of low income families. The number of 
children aged between 10 and 15 interviewed in the three waves of the UKHLS is 
approximately 14,350, among them only 13,300 answer the question on aspirations 
for higher education. After restricting the sample to the first observation per child 
within the panel, we are left with nearly 7,900 observations. These drop to 6,600 after 
excluding people leaving in either Scotland or Northern Ireland and to 5,400 when the 
ethnic minority boost sample is eliminated from the analysis. Concentrating on 
children with UK-born parents and eliminating those whose fathers are self-employed 
reduces the sample to 4,330 observations. Once we exclude children living in single-
parent households and only consider young individuals for whom we have complete 
information on their parental education and their paternal labour characteristics (i.e. 
                                                          
10
 Based on UKHLS data, 20% of British children live in a single-parent household and more than 90% 
of them live with their mothers. 
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wage
11
, occupation, union membership and firm size) we end up with a final sample 
of 1,985 10 to 15 year old respondents
12
.  
3.2 Main variables of interest 
We obtain information on 10 to 15 year old children’s aspirations for higher 
education through their response to the question “Would you like to go on to do 
further full-time education at a college or university after you finish school?”. Those 
who answer they would are classified as having high aspirations for higher education.  
A large proportion of children in our sample have high educational aspirations. In 
fact, 71.6% of 10 to 15 year olds reports wanting to go to university after finishing 
schooling. Since we keep the first observation from UKHLS youth panel respondents, 
younger individuals are overrepresented in our sample. According to summary 
statistics shown in Figure 1, 28% of the sample is 10 years old whereas the remaining 
age categories make up for a sample proportion that ranges between 13% and 16%. 
Contrary to the evidence in Rampino and Taylor (2014) based on the BHPS, 
children’s aspirations for higher education increase with age, such that only 60% of 
10 year olds report wanting to go to university against 83% of 15 year olds. We 
suspect this difference might be related to the recession of 2009, which had a global 
impact and high media coverage and resulted in a sharp increase in the youth 
unemployment rate
13
. An alternative explanation for this difference is that UKHLS 
                                                          
11
 In the initial sample almost 14% of fathers report a salary equal to zero or negative. 
12
 In the UKHLS when children live with both parents, fathers are only present at the time of interview 
in 70% of the cases, hence when we restrict the sample to children with a full set of information, the 
number of available observations drops dramatically. We run models where we control for 
households where fathers are absent at the time of interview and include a dummy identifying these 
particular cases. The results are consistent with our findings from our preferred sample. 
13 According to the discouraged worker hypothesis, the opportunity cost of education during 
economic downturns decreases making investment in education more attractive, which is reflected in 
reported aspirations for higher education (Taylor and Rampino 2013). Since older respondents are 
one year away from taking their GCSE qualifications and from deciding whether to stay in school or to 
enter the labour market they are probably paying more attention to the business cycle when 
reporting their aspirations for higher education than they used to in the past. 
14 
 
data are based on a different (and presumably more representative) sample of the UK 
population. 
Parental education in UKHLS is captured either in terms of attained qualification, 
or in terms of school leaving age. We measure the number of years of education 
attained by each parent subtracting five years from their reported school leaving age, 
since children in the UK enter education in the academic year they turn 5. Figure 2 
illustrates the relation between paternal education and children aspirations for higher 
education. Lower levels of father’s education are associated with smaller proportions 
of children reporting wanting to go to university. For 10 years of paternal education 
we observe that 31% of children do not want to go to university after they finish 
school, this proportion shrinks to 19% at 13 years of paternal education and to 24% at 
14 years of education, which is the highest recorded number of years of education in 
our sample.  
The relationship between maternal education and children’s aspirations for higher 
education, which is depicted in figure 3, is not as clear as the one between paternal 
education and children’s aspirations for higher education. The proportion of 10 to 15 
year olds reporting wanting to go to university visibly increases with maternal years 
of education when the latter ranges between 11 and 13.  Differently from paternal 
trends the second least positive educational aspirations are registered for 14 years of 
maternal education where the proportion of children not willing to go to university is 
29%.  
Our measure of household income corresponds to the derived total personal gross 
monthly income from paternal labour.
14
 Figure 4 displays the relationship between 
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 We also estimate models using the imputed measure of total gross monthly income, which takes 
into account any income source available in a household, including maternal labour income and 
benefits. Overall we obtain similar results in terms of the IV estimate of the effect of income on 
child’s aspirations for higher education. Results are available on request. We prefer using paternal 
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father’s wage and children’s aspirations for higher education. Wage is divided in 
quintiles and is represented on the horizontal axis. A clear negative relationship 
emerges such that the proportion of children reporting not wanting to go to university 
after finishing school clearly declines as paternal wage increases. Up to 34% of 
children, whose fathers’ gross labour income lays within the first quintile, do not 
want to go to university, however this proportion drops to 21% when we consider 
children whose fathers’ wage lays in the top part of the income distribution.  
3.3 Instrumental variables 
In our analysis we employ a set of instrumental variables in order to account for the 
endogeneity of parental education and household income in the estimation of 
children’s aspirations for higher education. More specifically we exploit the 
exogenous variation in parental education brought about by parental month of birth to 
separately estimate the causal effect of paternal and maternal education on children’s 
aspirations for higher education; similarly, we use occupation specific union premia 
to obtain exogenous variations in household income.  
We define parental month of birth (MoB) as a continuous variable that ranges 
between 1, for September–born parents, all the way to 12 for August-born parents. 
Month and cohort of birth allow us to control for the age at which parents sat their 
tests which affects their academic attainment as shown in Crawford et al. (2010). This 
variable is particularly relevant in the UK educational context given the structure of 
the school entry regulations.
15
 According to many studies (Crawford et al. 2007; 
                                                                                                                                                                     
labour income as opposed to household income since we are exploiting paternal union membership 
wage premia as a source of exogenous variation in income. We do not use maternal labour income, 
as this would pose further problems related to women’s selection into the labour market. 
15
 The academic year in the UK starts in September and ends in August of the following calendar year. 
Children in England and Wales are allowed to go to school on the academic year they turn 5 years 
old, hence students born on 1
st
 September of year t sit their tests together with children born on 31
st
 
August of year t+1. In addition to this, maintained school is the only type of publicly funded education 
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Crawford et al. 2010; Crawford et al. 2013) children sitting tests at a younger age 
than their peers (especially August-born students) incur an attainment penalty which 
persists throughout their compulsory education and up to the point of entry to 
university and for this reason it is important to take this into account when analysing 
their aspirations for higher education. Figure 5 and Figure 6 depict the relation 
between month of birth and educational attainment respectively for fathers and 
mothers. We compare the proportion of September born parents against the 
proportion of August-born parents for each year of attained education. In Figure 5 we 
can see how September born fathers are more educated than August born fathers, in 
fact the proportion of September-born fathers steadily increased with the number of 
years of education whereas the opposite is true for August-born fathers. In Figure 6 
we can notice how the proportion of September-born mothers is positively related 
with the level of attained education whereas the proportion of August-born mothers is 
negatively related to the number of years of attained education. This trend is similar 
to the one portrayed in Figure 5 even though the negative relation between month of 
birth and education is less pronounced for mothers than it is for fathers.
 16
 
Information on paternal union membership is only available at wave 1 and 3, for 
this reason we consider fathers to be union members if they were observed being part 
of a union at least once between 2009 and 2012.
17
 Paternal occupation, relating to 
father’s current job at time of interview, is recorded according to the Standard 
Occupational Classification 2000 (SOC2000). In the UKHLS a 4 digit occupational 
code is assigned post-field to the job description provided by the respondent. We 
                                                                                                                                                                     
and prior childcare arrangements can only either be provided at home or sought privately for a 
relatively expensive price. 
16 Since there are few observations at the top of the distribution of the number of years of education, both for fathers and for mothers, we are less likely to 
find a representative number of individuals born in either August or September. 
17
 We tried to use union coverage as opposed to union membership as an instrument for paternal 
income from labour but unfortunately this information is poorly measured in the UKHLS and for this 
reason we preferred using union membership. 
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group occupations into descending skill-categories, based on the first digit of the 
assigned occupational code which results in 8 main occupational groups:  managers, 
professionals, lower professionals, administrative & secretarial personnel, skilled 
trade workers, personal services workers, machine operatives and elementary 
occupation workers. Figure 7 shows the paternal wage distribution by union 
membership for the whole sample and separately by occupation. This graphical 
representation pinpoints the existence of occupation specific union membership 
premia. In general we can say that the wage distribution of union members dominates 
the wage distribution of non-union members and this is particularly true for fathers 
who work as professionals, in an administration and secretarial job and as machine 
operatives.  
3.4 Other control variables 
In all our specifications we control for a set of child’s and parental characteristics that 
are relevant to the formation of educational aspirations. We use information on 
child’s gender, month18 and cohort of birth, ethnicity, number of siblings, parental 
cohort of birth, occupation and firm size, year and region fixed effects.
19
 We report 
descriptive statistics for all our covariates in Table 1. 
Girls have higher aspirations than boys, in fact they make up for 56% of all 
children who report wanting to go to university but only for 38% of those who report 
not wanting to go to university after they finish school.   
Information on child’s ethnicity is only asked at wave 1 and wave 3 and for 
missing responses we are assigning maternal ethnicity, or, when this is missing, 
paternal ethnicity. Since ethnicity is an important determinant of educational 
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 Effectively we consider child’s month of birth as a proxy for previous educational attainment, even 
though test results would be preferable. 
19 
In our specifications we include as well a dummy identifying BHPS respondents since they were 
sampled according to different criteria with respect to UKHLS original sample members.  
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aspirations, but we are not using the ethnic minority boost from the UKHLS,
20
 we 
decided to group children according to only three main ethnic groups in order to 
achieve a sensitive number of observations for each category. The first one is 
composed by White British children; the second one comprises Indian, Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi students, whereas the last group accounts for the remaining ethnic 
minority categories. According to our descriptive statistics White British children are 
the ones with the lowest educational aspirations: they account for 86.5% of children 
who report wanting to go to university but 87.7% of children saying they do not want 
to go to university. The opposite is true for the remaining ethnic categories. In fact 
2.8% (0.5%) of children wanting to go to university are either Indian, Bangladeshi or 
Pakistani (from other ethnic groups) whereas only 2% (0.4%) of children not wanting 
to go to university belong to this ethnic group (other ethnic groups).   
 
4. Estimation strategy 
4.1 Model Estimation and specification 
In this paper we want to simultaneously evaluate the effect of parental education and 
household income on children’s aspirations for higher education using cross-sectional 
observations of 10 to 15 year old respondents from the youth panel component of the 
UKHLS.   
A child’s propensity to report aspirations for higher education could be represented 
as follows: 
𝑃𝑐ℎ = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐸ℎ
𝑓 + 𝛾𝐸ℎ
𝑚 + 𝛿𝑌ℎ + 𝑋𝑐ℎ
′ 𝜗 + 𝜀𝑐ℎ    (1) 
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 A boosted sample of 6,000 individuals from different ethnic minority groups was included in the 
UKHLS in order to obtain a significant number of respondents belonging to five target ethnic groups: 
Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Black Caribbean and Black African. We carry out further analysis 
including the ethnic minority boost sample and account for a more detailed definition of ethnicity in 
our robustness check paragraph. Results for this model are reported in Table B4, Table BFS4 and 
Table BIV4 in the appendix.    
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where c, f, m, h respectively refer to child, father, mother and household. We consider 
a linear probability model where 𝑃𝑐ℎ is a dummy variable which takes value 1 when a 
10-15 year old child c living in household h reports wanting to go to university and 0 
otherwise. A child’s aspirations for higher education are a function of parental 
education, accounted for separately by parental gender, such that 𝐸ℎ
𝑓
 represents the 
number of years of education attained by the child’ father, whereas 𝐸ℎ
𝑚 represents the 
number of years of education attained by the child’s mother; parental financial 
capability 𝑌ℎ, proxied by the natural logarithm of paternal gross labour earnings; a set 
of relevant observable, individual, parental and household characteristics 𝑋𝑐ℎ and 
finally an individual error term 𝜀𝑐ℎ. Observable characteristics 𝑋𝑐ℎ comprise the 
following: region of residence and year at the time of interview, mothers’ and fathers’ 
cohorts of birth, father’s firm size, child’s gender, month and cohort of birth, ethnicity 
and number of siblings.  
In the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations we progressively increase the 
number of regressors in order to shed light on the possible sources of endogeneity 
present in parental education and family income.  For instance, we specify the models 
without controlling for paternal occupation and subsequently controlling for it; this 
way we are able to verify whether unobserved paternal ability is reflected in the 
occupation fathers select in depending on how our estimates of the effect of paternal 
education and household income are robust to the different specifications. 
We are expecting 𝛽,  𝛾 and 𝛿 to be positively biased in an OLS setting if 
unobservable parental characteristics (e.g. motivation, discipline, self-esteem), 
positively correlated with parental education and household income, affect children’s 
aspirations for higher education. For example, a very disciplined individual might be 
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able to attain a higher than average level of education thanks to his consistent level of 
effort and his compliance to rules; he might select into an occupation which prices 
and rewards these characteristics and might encourage his child to behave similarly 
fostering his/her aspirations for higher education. In general, parental education may 
directly influence the production function of children’s cognitive and non-cognitive 
skills through its contribution on child’s health or child’s ability; it may affect 
preferences and choices of other inputs; and finally it may affect the quality and 
quantity of these inputs that contribute to the formation of aspirations for higher 
education through its effect on household income. Similarly, household income 
maybe correlated with unobservable characteristics of the parents or child which are 
correlated with child’s aspirations for higher education.  
In order to address our endogeneity concerns with respect to paternal education, 
maternal education and household income, we specify the following set of first stage 
regressions:  
 
𝐸ℎ
𝑓 = 𝜋1𝑀𝑜𝐵𝑓 + 𝑍𝑓
′ 𝜋2 + 𝜐𝑓  (2) 
 
𝐸ℎ
𝑚 = 𝜅1𝑀𝑜𝐵𝑚 + 𝑍𝑚
′ 𝜅2 + 𝜈𝑚  
 
(3) 
  
𝑌ℎ = 𝜏1(𝑃𝑈𝐹𝑓 ∗ 𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑓) + 𝑍ℎ
′ 𝜏2 + 𝜔𝑓  (4) 
 
where 𝑀𝑜𝐵𝑓,𝑚 represents paternal/maternal month of birth and is constructed as a 
continuous variable that takes value 1 if the parent was born in September all the way 
to value 12 for August-born parents; 𝑃𝑈𝐹𝑓 ∗ 𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑓 is the interaction between father’s 
union membership and father’s occupation according to the 8 occupational groups 
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described in paragraph 3.3;  𝑍 contains all the information in  𝑋𝑖 from equation (1) as 
well as all the relevant excluded instruments (for example maternal and paternal 
month of birth appear in 𝑍ℎ in (4), which is the equation representing household 
income and, conversely the interactions between paternal union membership and 
occupation appear in 𝑍𝑓 in (2) and 𝑍𝑚 in (3) which represent respectively paternal and 
maternal education. Also paternal/maternal month of birth is in 𝑍𝑓 /𝑍𝑚 ). 
It is well known that income has a positive effect on children’s education but what 
is not clear is whether this is the case because parental income reflects unobserved 
characteristics of the parent, which determine both income and children’s education, 
such as ability or motivation. For example, a highly motivated parent might put extra 
effort in his/her work and earn a higher than average salary, he/she might encourage 
his/her children to work hard at school and is able to pay for extra classes to help 
his/her children succeed in education. His/her children might be good at school as a 
consequence of the extra classes taken, which are affordable thanks to the higher than 
average salary earned by their parent. In order to be able to obtain the causal effect of 
parental income on children’s aspirations for higher education we need to observe a 
variation in income which is independent from parental ability, motivation or other 
unobserved characteristic of the parent, which may be correlated with both income 
and children’s educational aspirations. In order to do so, we use an instrumental 
variable strategy. We first instrument household income through union membership 
following Shea (2000) and then we follow Chevalier et al. (2013) and instrument 
household income through father’s union membership and father’s union-occupation 
interactions. Evidence of union and occupation specific wage premia exists as shown 
in Figure 7. If union membership is independent of father’s ability/motivation then 
union membership is able to identify changes in income, which are unrelated to 
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unobservable characteristics of fathers and therefore we can obtain causal estimates 
of the effect of household income on children’s educational aspirations. Interacting 
union membership with occupation allows us to further control for the potential 
relation between union membership and father’s ability which can be reflected in his 
union membership status. One can argue that union members have politically–driven 
attitudes towards education that might directly affect their children’s aspirations for 
higher education undermining the exclusion restriction of our IV estimations. In order 
to account for this possibility we estimated another set of regressions where we use 
only union membership interactions with paternal occupation as instruments, while 
including paternal union membership in the second stage equation. We believe the 
politically-driven attitude argument does not invalidate the use of union membership 
and occupation interactions as an excluded restriction for the following reasons: our 
sample of children is relatively young to have a clear understanding of political views 
regarding education; in addition to this, we doubt that paternal union-occupation 
interactions can have a direct impact on children’s aspirations for higher education 
since this would mean that children had a clear idea of the value of being a union 
member within each specific occupational context.  
Finally, we use parental month of birth as an instrument for parental education. 
Crawford et al. (2010) identified a persistent educational disadvantage for August- 
born children, which is related to the age at which students sit their exams. According 
to their findings August-born children perform worse than their September-born peers 
from the moment they enter the educational system. This disadvantage is more 
pronounced in the early stage of schooling but persists up until students take their 
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GCSEs exams at age 16 (Crawford et al. 2013).
21
 Since the age at which children go 
to school is determined by the month of birth and the English and Welsh school entry 
regulations, parental month of birth creates a change in parental educational 
attainment which should not directly affect children’s aspirations for higher education 
and qualifies as a good candidate for IV estimations. 
5. Results 
We first estimate the model in (1) using ordinary least squares, which only provides 
unbiased and consistent results as long as the error term is orthogonal to our 
explanatory variables. Results, reported in Table 2, are clustered at family level since 
more than 70% of our respondents have at least one sibling (more specifically there 
are 1,462 siblings in our sample). We estimate nine different specifications in order to 
evaluate whether the effects of parental education and household income are robust to 
different controls. Our results can be separated into three main groups, each of which 
includes three different estimates; these are structured in the same way within each 
group: the first equation aims at evaluating parental education effects, the second 
focuses on assessing the role of financial constraints proxied by paternal labour 
earnings, while the last evaluates the simultaneous effect of parental education and 
household income on child’s aspirations for higher education. The first group of 
estimations (models (1) to (3)) includes controls for gender, quarter and cohort of 
birth, ethnicity, number of siblings, parent's cohort of birth, father’s firm size, year 
and region fixed effects; the second group (models (4) to (6)) adds to the previous 
specification controls for father’s occupation; the last group (model (7) to (9)) further 
controls for father’s union membership. We opted for this increasing structure in our 
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 In England and Wales children have access to the (unpaid) educational system on the academic 
year in which they turn 5 years old. Children born in September are 1 year older than children born 
on 31
st
 August and when students face their tests at the end of the school year they have different 
ages.  
24 
 
specification in order to verify possible sources of endogeneity where our variables of 
interest failed to be robust to progressively richer sets or regressors.  
An extra year of father’s education appears to be correlated with the probability of 
a child to report wanting to go to university between 3 and 4.5 percentage points, as 
71.6% of our sample reports having high educational aspirations this effects is 
between 4.2 and 6.3 percent; maternal education is uncorrelated to child’s aspirations 
for higher education once we control for father’s education, whereas a 10% increase 
in household income is associated with an increase in the probability of reporting 
wanting to go to university that ranges between 0.5 and 0.8 percentage points. Models 
(3), (6) and (9) in Table 2 are the ones which interest us the most since they include 
both parental education and household income. In the models where we account only 
for parental education (i.e. models (1), (4) and (7)) or household income (i.e. models 
(2), (5) and (8)) the marginal effect estimates of parental education and household 
income on the likelihood of a child reporting aspirations for higher education are 
larger than the ones obtained in (3), (6) and (9). This result can be explained by the 
fact that parental education and household earnings are correlated to each other. This 
pattern is even more evident once we control for paternal occupation: when we 
account for it in model (6), paternal education
22
 and household income effects shrink 
respectively by a factor of 17% and 15% when compared to the estimates presented in 
(3). This implies that paternal occupation is positively correlated with both permanent 
and contingent measures of income in our model for child’s aspirations for higher 
education. Finally, after including paternal union membership to specifications (7) to 
(9) the effect of parental education and household income on child’s aspirations for 
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 Maternal education estimates follow the same trends as paternal education in our OLS 
specifications even though maternal education is never significant. The fact that maternal education 
effects shrink when we control for paternal occupation could be due to assortative mating. 
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higher education is not affected, which means that father’s union membership is not 
correlated to parental education and household income after we account for paternal 
occupation.  
Overall, in the OLS specification reported in Table 2, both paternal education and 
household income play a role in shaping child’s aspirations for higher education. The 
impact of father’s education appears to be the only important long-term determinant 
of the probability of a child reporting wanting to go to university, whereas mother’s 
education is never relevant, even though maternal and paternal education have a 
correlation of 0.37. If we considered these results as unbiased we could conclude that 
both long-term family endowments, especially paternal ones, and contingent financial 
constraints influence child’s aspirations for higher education.  
In order to simultaneously account for parental education and household income 
endogeneity we next estimate an IV model. First-stage regressions are reported in 
Table 3. Results are divided in three main groups depending on the combination of 
instruments selected to estimate paternal education, maternal education and 
household income. The first stage regressions for each of the three endogenous 
variables of our model are estimated through three different sets of instruments as 
well as through the exogenous covariates specified in the initial OLS regressions. In 
this way group (1) uses each parent month of birth and paternal union membership as 
the excluded instruments; group (2) uses each parent month of birth, paternal union 
membership and paternal union-occupation interactions as the excluded instruments; 
and finally group (3) uses each parent month of birth, and paternal union-occupation 
interactions as the excluded instruments while paternal union membership is 
controlled for also in the main equation.  
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Our preferred specification is the one reported for group (3) where we instrument 
parental education with parental month of birth, and use union occupation interactions 
to instrument for household income. We will focus on the effect of the excluded 
exogenous variables on the endogenous variables and interpret post estimation tests 
on the strength of the selected instruments in the light of the critical values outlined in 
Stock and Yogo (2005).   
Overall instruments seem to operate according to our predictions.
23
 The coefficient 
estimates obtained for both paternal and maternal month of birth are robust to the 
three different combinations of instruments and covariates used in the first stage IV 
regressions. August-born fathers attain a lower number of years of education with 
respect to their September-born peers. The educational disadvantage they suffer from 
sitting their exams at a younger age than the other students in their academic cohort 
can result in up to one third of a year (more precisely 3.96 months) less education. 
The same mechanism operates for maternal education. August-born mothers’ 
academic disadvantage accrues to a lower educational attainment of almost 6 months 
when compared to September-born mothers within the same cohort. Our first stage 
regression results for the effect of parental month of birth on parental education are 
significantly larger in magnitude than the ones obtained in Chevalier et al. (2013). 
This might be due to the fact that, differently from the authors, we are not using the 
raise in the minimum school leaving age (i.e. RoSLA) together with month of birth as 
instruments for parental education. In fact, in the UKHLS, which collects information 
on individuals surveyed between 2009 and 2012, the proportion of parents affected by 
the 1972 RoSLA is much smaller than the one reported in Chevalier et al. (2013) 
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 We find that the paternal union membership interaction with working as a professional has a positive 
and significant effect on maternal education, even though we were not necessarily expecting this to be 
the case. We think this can be due to possible correlations between these two instruments, which could 
be caused by assortative mating. 
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which uses LFS data collected between 1992 and 2012 and for this reason we cannot 
exploit RoSLA as a further instrument for parental education.
24
  
We specified three different sets of instruments for the first stage regressions of 
household income. In specification (1) of Table 3 we exploit the variation in paternal 
labour income associated with paternal union membership. According to our results 
being a union member increases father’s monthly gross wage by 7%. In (2) we 
instrumented household income through paternal union membership and paternal 
union membership-occupation interactions, whereas in specification (3) we only use 
paternal labour earnings variations associated with paternal union membership-
occupation interactions to instrument for household income and use paternal union 
membership as an included instrument. Estimation results for the first stage 
regressions of the household income equation are practically identical between 
specification (2) and (3). Interactions between union membership and paternal 
occupation highlight the existence of union wage premia variations across 
occupations. In particular professional, lower professional and skilled trade unionised 
workers enjoy a union wage premium that ranges between 17% and 20% with respect 
to managers with a union membership.  
We need to test the predictive power of our excluded instruments to make sure our 
second stage results are not biased. Since we are engaging in an unconventional 
approach where we try to address the endogeneity of more than one variable 
simultaneously, we produce a set of test statistics, which evaluate the identification 
strength of our instruments within different analytical contexts. We report the F-test 
statistic of all instruments for each endogenous variable separately along with the 
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 Only 7% of the fathers and 2% of mothers in our sample were born before September 1957 as 
opposed to approximately 40% of fathers and 30% of mothers in the sample selected in Chevalier et 
al. (2013). We have estimated our models using both parental RoSLA and month of birth as 
instruments for parental education but RoSLA was never significant in any of the first stage regression 
specifications. Results are not reported in this paper but are available on request.  
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Angrist and Pishcke partial R
2
,
 
and the F-test statistic of all instruments in all 
equations jointly. We use the critical values reported in Stock and Yogo (2005), 
which allow us to assess at a 5% significance level whether we obtain better estimates 
using an IV approach as opposed to an OLS approach in terms of relative bias. 
Overall, the first stage F-statistics reveal that our instruments weakly identify our 
endogenous variables in each of the three different specifications shown in Table 3. 
The only exception is represented by maternal month of birth in model specification 
(1). The Kleibergen-Paap F statistic, which tests the identification strength of the 
equation as a whole, for this instrument is 11.65. Stock and Yogo (2005) do not 
produce any critical values for models with three endogenous variables and three 
instruments, as is the case for (1), and for this reason we use the conventional Staiger 
and Stock (1997) rule of thumb according to which F-statistics should be larger than 
10 to ensure that the maximum relative bias of the IV estimator is less than 10%. In 
addition to this, the partial R
2
 results confirm that our instruments, even though 
significant, lack explanatory power with respect to the endogenous variables. For 
instance, in (2), the specification for which we obtain the largest partial R
2 
results, we 
find that our set of instruments is only able to explain 2.5% of the variation in the 
number of years of paternal education, 4% of the variation in mother’s education and 
only 1.1% of the variation in father’s income from labour. Finally, the F-statistics 
computed jointly for all the instruments in all endogenous variable equations pose 
further doubts on the explanatory power of our instruments with respect to the 
endogenous variable.   
Overall we can conclude that all our instruments suffer from weak identification 
problems, even though month of birth seems to be comparatively a better instrument 
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for maternal than it is for paternal education, or union membership and union-
occupation interactions are for father’s earnings. 
Table 4 shows the second stage results of the IV estimations. Specifications (1) 
and (2) are the IV equivalent of OLS specification (6) in Table 2. In (1), where we 
employ parental month of birth and paternal union membership as instruments we 
obtain a significant estimate only for maternal education. This is the model for which 
maternal education is best identified in the first stage equation. An extra year of 
maternal schooling is associated with a reduction in the probability of a child to report 
wanting to go to university of 12.3 percentage points, an estimate significant at the 
10% level. The magnitude of the IV coefficient estimate is bigger than the magnitude 
of the non-significant OLS coefficient estimate of 0.5 percentage points. The effect of 
paternal education is not significantly different from zero in the IV specification, 
which is smaller than the 3 percentage point effect obtained in the OLS model. The 
same reasoning applies to household income, which becomes irrelevant in the IV 
specification but is significant and positive, even though quite small in magnitude, in 
the OLS estimate. 
For specification (2) of Table 4 we use parental month of birth, paternal union 
membership and paternal union membership-occupation interactions as instruments 
of our endogenous variables. As with the previous specification, we find no 
statistically significant effect of household income on the probability of a child to 
report aspirations for higher education as opposed to the OLS estimate which shows a 
positive and significant impact of household income. Differently from specification 
(1), in (2) the effect of maternal education on child’s aspirations for higher education 
ceases to be statistically different from zero, whereas the effect of father’s education 
is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level. Each extra year of paternal 
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education increases child’s aspirations for higher education by 15.9 percentage points. 
The magnitude of this effect is extremely big if we take into account that on average 
more than 70% of the children in our sample report wanting to go to university. In 
addition to this, we need to be particularly careful when interpreting this result since 
according to the first stage regression analysis our identification strategy is quite 
weak.  
Our favourite specification is model (3) where parental education is instrumented 
by month of birth and household income by paternal union membership-occupation 
interactions; father’s union membership and father’s occupation are treated as 
exogenous controls in this model. We find no maternal education or household 
income effect statistically different from zero. Paternal education is significantly 
different from zero at the 10% level and each extra year of father’s education is 
associated with an increase of 21 percentage points in the probability of a child to 
report wanting to go to university. As for specification (2) we must be careful in 
attaching any meaning to this result since our instruments do not strongly identify our 
endogenous variable. In addition to this the standard errors we obtain for all the 
model specifications of the second stage regressions are so big that we are not able to 
say that IV coefficients differ in magnitude from the OLS ones.  
Overall, IV estimates of the effect of maternal education and paternal labour 
earnings produce results smaller in magnitude than the ones obtained through OLS, 
whereas the opposite is true for paternal education. We need to be cautious when 
interpreting our results: even though the estimated effects of the instruments on the 
endogenous variables are operating in the right direction and are statistically 
significant, the first stage tests for identification strength reveal that our identification 
strategy is weak. As a result of this, the IV coefficient estimates for parental 
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education and paternal labour income are so highly imprecise that the OLS point 
estimates all fall within the confidence intervals of the IV estimates.  
6. Robustness checks 
The decision to use the three available waves of the UKHSL to address our research 
question was predominantly based on the idea to obtain the largest possible number 
of observations. Even if a big sample is not a sufficient condition to overcome IV bias 
issues associated with weak instruments, a small sample will more likely return IV 
estimates that suffer from finite-sample bias (Bound et al. 1995). Ideally we would 
have included the ethnic minority boost (EMB) sample observations in our analysis 
but unfortunately the UKHLS does not provide weights to combine different cross-
sectional waves. As a consequence of this we could only concentrate on the sample, 
described in section 3.3.1, from the main survey and computed unweighted estimates 
of the effect of parental education and household income on the aspirations for higher 
education of 10 to 15 year old children.     
In order to verify our results do not suffer from bias associated with non-response 
and sampling design we replicate our analysis on two different samples, clustering at 
the primary sampling unit level, and report both weighted and unweighted estimates 
as recommended in Solon et al. 2013. We only use the first wave of UKHLS because 
cross-sectional weights are only applicable to the analysis of the specific wave they 
were computed for and, in addition to this, data are cleaner and do not suffer from 
sampling issues such as attrition.  
The first sample is an exact replica of the sample selected for our analysis so far, 
but only considers data collected in the first wave; hence we have 962 observations, 
which is less than half the size of our principal sample. We report both unweighted 
results (Table B1, Table BFS1 and Table BIV1) and weighted results (Table B2, 
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Table BFS2 and Table BIV2) in appendix B. The OLS regression results are slightly 
higher, both for weighted (Table B2) and unweighted (Table B1) estimates when 
compared to our preferred model in Table 2. The first stage regression estimates 
confirm that our instruments are weak. Finally the IV results reveal no statistically 
significant effect of parental education and household income on children’s 
aspirations for higher education whether the estimates are weighted (Table B2) or 
unweighted (Table B1).  
The second sample, which includes 1,020 individuals, reflects our ideal sample 
choice and includes the EMB observations in the analysis. For this sample we are 
able to account for the following ethnic groups: White British, Other White, Indian, 
Bangladeshi, Black African, Pakistani, Black Caribbean, Mixed and other ethnicities. 
We report both unweighted results (Table B3, Table BFS3 and Table BIV3) and 
weighted results (Table B4, Table BFS4 and Table BIV4) in appendix B. Overall 
OLS estimates are higher in magnitude for both specifications when compared to the 
principal estimates in Table 2, even though weighted coefficients (B4) are slightly 
less precisely estimated than unweighted ones (B3). All instruments seem to work 
properly in the estimations reported in either Table BFS3 (unweighted) or Table 
BFS4 (weighted), in fact month of birth has a negative impact on the number of years 
of education of both parents, while unionised fathers working as professionals enjoy a 
positive wage premium with respect to unionised fathers working as managers. 
Contrary to the results from our preferred specification, paternal union membership is 
never significant, and there are negative union wage premia attached to lower skill 
occupations. The best set of instruments for this sample is represented by the 
combination of parental month of birth and paternal union-occupation interactions, 
even though overall these instruments are weak in both the weighted and unweighted 
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specifications. Finally, the IV results are very imprecisely estimated and even if there 
are positive big effects of paternal education on children’s aspirations for higher 
education we cannot claim these estimates are significantly different from the ones 
obtained in the OLS regression either for weighted (Table BIV4) or unweighted 
(Table BIV3) specifications. 
Applying the analysis to a single wave does not produce any improvement in our 
results as we had anticipated; hence our choice to pool together as many non-
repetitive cross-sectional observations to address our concerns about small-sample 
bias in IV estimations is still our preferred option. In addition to this, the fact that we 
do not find relevant differences between weighted and unweighted estimations 
reassures us on the validity of the results obtained in our main specification.    
7. Conclusions 
We use data from the youth component of the UK Household Longitudinal Survey to 
evaluate the impact of parental education and household income on 10 to 15 year old 
aspirations for higher education. OLS estimations reveal no maternal education 
effects but positive, even though small in magnitude, paternal education and 
household income effects. We use an IV approach to simultaneously address the 
endogeneity between parental education, household income and children’s aspirations 
for higher education. More specifically, we exploit the exogenous variation in both 
paternal and maternal education brought about by their month of birth and the 
exogenous variation in income associated with occupation specific union membership 
premia. First stage regression diagnostics pinpoint relevant weaknesses in our 
identification strategy. IV estimates of the model to simultaneously account for 
parental education and household income effects produce no statistically significant 
coefficients for household income and generally for maternal education, but positive 
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even though very imprecisely estimated effects of paternal education. The size of our 
current sample makes the IV identification of three endogenous variables particularly 
challenging; as more waves of UKHLS become available we will be able to increase 
our sample size and eventually reinforce our identification strategy. Similarly, 
looking for other possible instruments could allow us to obtain more precise causal 
estimations of the role of parental education and household income in the formation 
of aspirations for higher education and to offer grounds for policy recommendations. 
For instance, we could exploit a variation in labour income brought about by a shock 
in paternal health as long as we can argue that a shock in paternal health only affects 
children’s educational aspirations through labour income. Eventually we could use 
exogenous variations in grandparents’ education to account for parental education in 
shaping children’s aspirations for higher education. 25  Finally, as more waves become 
available we could run panel data models, provided we can observe enough 
educational aspiration and income variation within the five years of the UKHLS 
youth panel component. 
Further room for improvement to address our research question on the separate 
role of parental education and household income in shaping children’s aspiration for 
higher education can be achieved once special licence data linking UKHLS youth 
panel respondents to the NPD will be released. This data will allow us to obtain a 
measure of academic ability we would not otherwise have. When we control for 
children’s quarter of birth in our model specifications we are capturing a measure of 
their scholastic ability related to the age at which they sit their tests at school. A better 
                                                          
25
 In Chevalier et al. (2013) parental education is instrumented by both month of birth and RoSLA. We 
could not use the exogenous variation in the number of years of education brought about by the 
1972 increase in the school leaving age since our parents are relatively young and a very limited 
proportion of them was affected by this policy. Conversely, we might expect a greater proportion of 
grandparents, as opposed to parents, of the children in our sample to have been affected by the 
RoSLA. 
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measure of ability is highly desirable for our main model since educational 
aspirations are strongly related to revealed ability and, in addition to this, we are 
using cross-sectional data which, differently from panel data, cannot account for time 
invariant student’s ability. 
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 9. Tables and figures 
Figure 1. Sample age distribution and age trends of 10 to 15 year old children’s 
aspirations for higher education: UKHLS: 2009-2012 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Aspirations for higher education by father’s years of education
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Figure 3. Aspirations for higher education by mother’s years of education 
 
Figure 4. Aspirations for higher education by father’s gross labour income 
quintiles 
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Figure 5. Paternal education and paternal month of birth by years of education 
(September vs. August born) 
 
Figure 6. Maternal education and maternal month of birth by years of education 
(September vs. August born) 
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Figure 7. Distribution of household monthly gross income by paternal occupation 
and union membership: UKHLS: 2009-2012 
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Table 1. Mean of explanatory variables by child’s aspirations for higher education 
 Wants to go to university 
Yes No 
Child’s characteristics     
Girl 0.558 0.497 0.380 0.486 
Age 12.319 1.786 11.588 1.672 
White British 0.865 0.342 0.877 0.328 
Indian, Bangladeshi and Pakistani 0.028 0.165 0.020 0.139 
Other ethnic group 0.051 0.219 0.041 0.198 
Number of siblings 1.106 0.958 1.227 1.048 
Father’s characteristics     
Age(father) 43.643 6.083 42.346 6.363 
Years of education(father) 11.570 1.018 11.352 0.911 
September-born(father) 0.088 0.283 0.085 0.280 
August-born(father) 0.088 0.283 0.083 0.277 
Union membership(father) 0.222 0.416 0.217 0.412 
Firm size:     
1-2 Employees 0.034 0.182 0.025 0.156 
3-9 Employees 0.079 0.271 0.099 0.300 
10-24 Employees 0.117 0.321 0.124 0.330 
25-49 Employees 0.125 0.331 0.105 0.307 
50-99 Employees 0.103 0.305 0.107 0.309 
100-199 Employees 0.095 0.293 0.103 0.304 
200-499 Employees 0.118 0.323 0.135 0.342 
500-999 Employees 0.077 0.266 0.057 0.232 
1000+ Employees 0.135 0.342 0.089 0.285 
Occupation:     
Managers 0.279 0.449 0.222 0.416 
Professionals 0.156 0.363 0.105 0.307 
Lower professionals 0.136 0.343 0.142 0.349 
Administrative and secretarial 
workers 
0.043 0.203 0.046 0.210 
Skilled trade workers 0.115 0.320 0.171 0.376 
Personal services workers 0.044 0.206 0.046 0.210 
Machine operatives 0.138 0.345 0.183 0.387 
Elementary occupation workers 0.088 0.283 0.085 0.280 
Father's gross monthly wage 3,016       1,525 2,662       1,428 
Mother’s characteristics     
Age(mother) 41.541 5.365 40.288 5.710 
Years of education(mother) 11.525 1.003 11.412 0.917 
September-born(mother) 0.064 0.245 0.089 0.285 
August-born(mother) 0.081 0.273 0.076 0.266 
Sample size 1,422 563 
Notes: Estimation sample summary statistics. Standard deviations in italics 
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Table 2. Effects of parental education and income on child’s aspirations for higher education: UKHLS 2009-2012 
OLS REGRESSIONS 
Go to university(UKHLS) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Father's years of education 0.045***  0.036*** 0.034***  0.030*** 0.034***  0.030*** 
 (0.0102)  (0.0104) (0.0109)  (0.0109) (0.0109)  (0.0109) 
Mother's years of education 0.001  -0.002 -0.004  -0.005 -0.004  -0.005 
 (0.0105)  (0.0105) (0.0106)  (0.0106) (0.0106)  (0.0106) 
Father's log monthly gross wage  0.080*** 0.060***  0.062*** 0.052**  0.061*** 0.052** 
  (0.0190) (0.0200)  (0.0218) (0.0220)  (0.0219) (0.0221) 
Father's occupation No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Father's union membership No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N observations 1,985 1,985 1,985 1,985 1,985 1,985 1,985 1,985 1,985 
Notes: Dependent variable takes the value 1 if the child reports wanting to go to university and 0 if he/she does not want to go to university. All models also include 
controls for student's gender, month and cohort of birth, ethnicity, number of siblings, parent's cohort of birth, father’s firm size, year and region fixed effects. 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the family level are reported in parentheses. Symbols: *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 
5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
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Table 3. Effects of parental education and household income on child’s aspirations for higher education: UKHLS 2009- 2012 
FIRST STAGE IV REGRESSIONS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Father’s 
years of 
education 
Mother’s 
years of 
education 
Father’s log 
monthly 
gross wage 
Father’s 
years of 
education 
Mother’s 
years of 
education 
 Father’s log 
monthly 
gross wage 
Father’s 
years of 
education 
Mother’s 
years of 
education 
Father’s log 
monthly 
gross wage 
Father's Month of Birth -0.030*** 0.008 -0.007* -0.030*** 0.008 -0.007* -0.030*** 0.008 -0.007* 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) 
Mother's Month of Birth -0.009 -0.045*** -0.001 -0.010 -0.046*** -0.001 -0.010 -0.046*** -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) 
Father's Union Membership -0.015 0.029 0.068** -0.077 0.048 -0.065    
 (0.064) (0.066) (0.028) (0.165) (0.172) (0.057)    
Union*Professional    0.457* 0.507** 0.174** 0.457* 0.507** 0.174** 
    (0.240) (0.240) (0.086) (0.240) (0.240) (0.086) 
Union*Lower Professional    -0.007 -0.222 0.108 -0.007 -0.222 0.108 
    (0.222) (0.229) (0.084) (0.222) (0.229) (0.084) 
Union*Admin & Secretarial    -0.187 -0.348 0.209 -0.187 -0.348 0.209 
    (0.330) (0.292) (0.132) (0.330) (0.292) (0.132) 
Union*Skilled Trade    -0.152 -0.151 0.194** -0.152 -0.151 0.194** 
    (0.190) (0.228) (0.090) (0.190) (0.228) (0.090) 
Union*Personal Services    0.544 -0.382 0.172 0.544 -0.382 0.172 
    (0.339) (0.313) (0.184) (0.339) (0.313) (0.184) 
Union*Machine Operatives    -0.035 0.024 0.199** -0.035 0.024 0.199** 
    (0.195) (0.217) (0.082) (0.195) (0.217) (0.082) 
Union*Elementary Occupations    -0.024 0.069 0.098 -0.024 0.069 0.098 
    (0.232) (0.264) (0.112) (0.232) (0.264) (0.112) 
Weak id F-stat (father's education) 5.831   3.396   3.583   
Partial R-squared (father's education) 0.015   0.0250   0.025   
Weak id F-stat (mother's education)  11.65   5.344   5.903  
Partial R-squared (mother's 
education) 
 0.028   0.040   0.040  
Weak id F-stat (household income)   2.938   1.672   1.234 
Partial R-squared (household income)   0.006   0.011   0.007 
Global weak id F-stat 1.887 1.598 0.885 
Notes: All models also include controls for student's gender, month of birth, ethnicity, number of siblings, parent's cohort of birth, father’s firm size, year and region 
fixed effects. MoB stands for month of birth and more specifically it is a variable that takes values from 1, if the parent is born in September, to 12 if the parent is born in 
August. FUM is a dummy identifying father’s union membership; F.Occ represents dummies for father’s occupation. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted 
for clustering at family level are reported in parentheses. Symbols: *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level 
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Table 4. Effects of parental education and household income on child’s aspirations for higher education: UKHLS 2009- 2012 
SECOND STAGE IV REGRESSIONS 
Go to university (UKHLS) (1) (2) (3) 
Father's years of education -0.020 0.159* 0.210* 
 (0.126) (0.089) (0.114) 
Mother's years of education -0.123* -0.073 -0.099 
 (0.070) (0.061) (0.075) 
Father's log monthly gross wage 0.047 -0.296 -0.607 
 (0.371) (0.265) (0.407) 
Instrumental variables MoB  
FUM 
MoB  
FUM  
FUM*Occ 
MoB  
FUM*Occ 
Father's occupation Yes Yes Yes 
Father's union membership No No Yes 
Observations 1,985 1,985 1,985 
Notes: Dependent variable takes the value 1 if the child reports wanting to go to university and 0 if he/she does not want to go to university. All models also 
include controls for student's gender, month and cohort of birth, ethnicity, number of siblings, parent's cohort of birth, father’s firm size, year and region fixed 
effects MoB stands for month of birth and more specifically it is a variable that takes values from 1, if the parent is born in September, to 12 if the parent is born 
in August.. FUM is a dummy identifying father’s union membership; F.Occ represents dummies for father’s occupation. Heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors adjusted for clustering at the family level are reported in parentheses. Symbols: *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% 
level. 
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APPENDIX B 
Table B1. Effects of parental education and income on child’s aspirations for higher education: UKHLS 2009-2012 
OLS REGRESSIONS 
Go to university(UKHLS) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Father's years of education 0.056***  0.045*** 0.036***  0.031** 0.036***  0.031** 
 (0.0122)  (0.0124) (0.0132)  (0.0131) (0.0132)  (0.0131) 
Mother's years of education -0.006  -0.007 -0.012  -0.011 -0.012  -0.012 
 (0.0133)  (0.0134) (0.0133)  (0.0133) (0.0133)  (0.0133) 
Father's log monthly gross wage  0.091*** 0.069***  0.061** 0.052**  0.060** 0.051** 
  (0.0218) (0.0225)  (0.0236) (0.0234)  (0.0237) (0.0236) 
Father's occupation No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Father's union membership No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N observations 962 962 962 962 962 962 962 962 962 
Notes: Dependent variable takes the value 1 if the child reports wanting to go to university and 0 if he/she does not want to go to university. All models also include 
controls for student's gender, month and cohort of birth, ethnicity, number of siblings, parent's cohort of birth, father’s firm size, year and region fixed effects. 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the primary sampling unit level are reported in parentheses. Symbols: *** significant at 1% level; 
** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. The sample is derived using the first wave of the UKHLS youth panel component.  
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Table BFS1. Effects of parental education and household income on child’s aspirations for higher education: UKHLS 2009- 2012 
FIRST STAGE IV REGRESSIONS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Father’s 
years of 
education 
Mother’s 
years of 
education 
Father’s log 
monthly 
gross wage 
Father’s 
years of 
education 
Mother’s 
years of 
education 
 Father’s log 
monthly 
gross wage 
Father’s 
years of 
education 
Mother’s 
years of 
education 
Father’s log 
monthly 
gross wage 
Father's Month of Birth -0.025** 0.008 -0.003 -0.026*** 0.006 -0.004 -0.026*** 0.006 -0.004 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) 
Mother's Month of Birth -0.007 -0.046*** 0.001 -0.007 -0.046*** 0.001 -0.007 -0.046*** 0.001 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.006) 
Father's Union Membership 0.061 0.037 0.098** 0.197 0.181 0.013    
 (0.086) (0.094) (0.044) (0.253) (0.252) (0.101)    
Union*Professional    0.179 0.501 0.199 0.179 0.501 0.199 
    (0.329) (0.337) (0.136) (0.329) (0.337) (0.136) 
Union*Lower Professional    -0.193 -0.454 0.012 -0.193 -0.454 0.012 
    (0.335) (0.350) (0.146) (0.335) (0.350) (0.146) 
Union*Admin & Secretarial    -0.432 -0.678* 0.157 -0.432 -0.678* 0.157 
    (0.644) (0.404) (0.292) (0.644) (0.404) (0.292) 
Union*Skilled Trade    -0.281 -0.298 0.168 -0.281 -0.298 0.168 
    (0.282) (0.345) (0.158) (0.282) (0.345) (0.158) 
Union*Personal Services    -0.188 -0.507 -0.134 -0.188 -0.507 -0.134 
    (0.416) (0.449) (0.230) (0.416) (0.449) (0.230) 
Union*Machine Operatives    -0.288 -0.120 0.138 -0.288 -0.120 0.138 
    (0.291) (0.305) (0.129) (0.291) (0.305) (0.129) 
Union*Elementary Occupations    -0.074 -0.395 0.072 -0.074 -0.395 0.072 
    (0.386) (0.350) (0.200) (0.386) (0.350) (0.200) 
Weak id F-stat (father's education) 2.573   1.261   1.383   
Partial R-squared (father's education) 0.012   0.019   0.0180   
Weak id F-stat (mother's education)  5.930   3.406   3.784  
Partial R-squared (mother's 
education) 
 0.030   0.052   0.052  
Weak id F-stat (household income)   1.720   1.258   0.574 
Partial R-squared (household income)   0.007   0.014   0.007 
Global weak id F-stat 1.259 1.117 0.531 
Notes: All models also include controls for student's gender, month of birth, ethnicity, number of siblings, parent's cohort of birth, father’s firm size, year and region 
fixed effects. MoB stands for month of birth and more specifically it is a variable that takes values from 1, if the parent is born in September, to 12 if the parent is born in 
August. FUM is a dummy identifying father’s union membership; F.Occ represents dummies for father’s occupation. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted 
for clustering at primary sampling unit level are reported in parentheses. Symbols: *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. The 
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sample is derived using the first wave of the UKHLS youth panel component. 
 
Table BIV1. Effects of parental education and household income on child’s aspirations for higher education: UKHLS 2009- 2012 
SECOND STAGE IV REGRESSIONS 
Go to university (UKHLS) (1) (2) (3) 
Father's years of education -0.194 0.097 0.107 
 (0.191) (0.109) (0.118) 
Mother's years of education -0.149 -0.051 -0.047 
 (0.108) (0.062) (0.066) 
Father's log monthly gross wage 0.389 0.109 -0.088 
 (0.459) (0.222) (0.348) 
Instrumental variables MoB  
FUM 
MoB  
FUM 
 FUM*Occ 
MoB  
FUM*Occ 
Father's occupation Yes Yes Yes 
Father's union membership No No Yes 
Observations 962 962 962 
Notes: Dependent variable takes the value 1 if the child reports wanting to go to university and 0 if he/she does not want to go to university. All models also 
include controls for student's gender, month and cohort of birth, ethnicity, number of siblings, parent's cohort of birth, father’s firm size, year and region fixed 
effects. MoB stands for month of birth and more specifically it is a variable that takes values from 1, if the parent is born in September, to 12 if the parent is born 
in August. FUM is a dummy identifying father’s union membership; F.Occ represents dummies for father’s occupation. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors 
adjusted for clustering at primary sampling unit level are reported in parentheses. Symbols: *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 
10% level. The sample is derived using the first wave of the UKHLS youth panel component. 
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Table B2. Effects of parental education and income on child’s aspirations for higher education: UKHLS 2009-2012 
OLS REGRESSIONS 
Go to university(UKHLS) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Father's years of education 0.057***  0.045*** 0.036***  0.030** 0.036***  0.030** 
 (0.0126)  (0.0127) (0.0135)  (0.0134) (0.0135)  (0.0134) 
Mother's years of education -0.003  -0.005 -0.009  -0.009 -0.009  -0.009 
 (0.0138)  (0.0139) (0.0137)  (0.0137) (0.0137)  (0.0137) 
Father's log monthly gross wage  0.102*** 0.080***  0.073*** 0.064**  0.073*** 0.063** 
  (0.0230) (0.0237)  (0.0251) (0.0250)  (0.0252) (0.0251) 
Father's occupation No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Father's union membership No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N observations 962 962 962 962 962 962 962 962 962 
Notes: Dependent variable takes the value 1 if the child reports wanting to go to university and 0 if he/she does not want to go to university. All models also include 
controls for student's gender, month and cohort of birth, ethnicity, number of siblings, parent's cohort of birth, father’s firm size, year and region fixed effects. 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the primary sampling unit level are reported in parentheses. Symbols: *** significant at 1% level; 
** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. The sample is derived using the first wave of the UKHLS youth panel component and estimates are weighted using 
cross-sectional youth self-completion weights. 
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Table BFS2. Effects of parental education and household income on child’s aspirations for higher education: UKHLS 2009- 2012 
FIRST STAGE IV REGRESSIONS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Father’s 
years of 
education 
Mother’s 
years of 
education 
Father’s log 
monthly 
gross wage 
Father’s 
years of 
education 
Mother’s 
years of 
education 
 Father’s log 
monthly 
gross wage 
Father’s 
years of 
education 
Mother’s 
years of 
education 
Father’s log 
monthly 
gross wage 
Father's Month of Birth -0.023** 0.009 -0.001 -0.024** 0.008 -0.002 -0.024** 0.008 -0.002 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) 
Mother's Month of Birth -0.005 -0.048*** 0.002 -0.004 -0.048*** 0.002 -0.004 -0.048*** 0.002 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.006) 
Father's Union Membership 0.035 0.043 0.087** 0.157 0.186 0.016    
 (0.086) (0.096) (0.043) (0.250) (0.268) (0.097)    
Union*Professional    0.164 0.491 0.198 0.164 0.491 0.198 
    (0.332) (0.347) (0.132) (0.332) (0.347) (0.132) 
Union*Lower Professional    -0.161 -0.504 0.001 -0.161 -0.504 0.001 
    (0.338) (0.369) (0.143) (0.338) (0.369) (0.143) 
Union*Admin & Secretarial    -0.372 -0.726* 0.222 -0.372 -0.726* 0.222 
    (0.659) (0.395) (0.273) (0.659) (0.395) (0.273) 
Union*Skilled Trade    -0.232 -0.311 0.113 -0.232 -0.311 0.113 
    (0.279) (0.354) (0.152) (0.279) (0.354) (0.152) 
Union*Personal Services    -0.150 -0.333 -0.138 -0.150 -0.333 -0.138 
    (0.408) (0.460) (0.224) (0.408) (0.460) (0.224) 
Union*Machine Operatives    -0.272 -0.111 0.106 -0.272 -0.111 0.106 
    (0.285) (0.313) (0.127) (0.285) (0.313) (0.127) 
Union*Elementary Occupations    -0.111 -0.380 0.034 -0.111 -0.380 0.034 
    (0.375) (0.361) (0.192) (0.375) (0.361) (0.192) 
Weak id F-stat (father's education) 1.918   0.974   1.082   
Partial R-squared (father's education) 0.009   0.015   0.015   
Weak id F-stat (mother's education)  6.145   3.505   3.892  
Partial R-squared (mother's 
education) 
 0.031   0.053   0.052  
Weak id F-stat (household income)   1.372   1.095   0.565 
Partial R-squared (household income)   0.005   0.012   0.007 
Global weak id F-stat 1.376 0.925 0.533 
Notes: All models also include controls for student's gender, month of birth, ethnicity, number of siblings, parent's cohort of birth, father’s firm size, year and region 
fixed effects. MoB stands for month of birth and more specifically it is a variable that takes values from 1, if the parent is born in September, to 12 if the parent is born in 
August. FUM is a dummy identifying father’s union membership; F.Occ represents dummies for father’s occupation. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted 
for clustering at primary sampling unit level are reported in parentheses. Symbols: *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. The 
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sample is derived using the first wave of the UKHLS youth panel component and estimates are weighted using cross-sectional youth self-completion weights. 
 
Table BIV2. Effects of parental education and household income on child’s aspirations for higher education: UKHLS 2009- 2012 
SECOND STAGE IV REGRESSIONS 
Go to university (UKHLS) (1) (2) (3) 
Father's years of education -0.192 0.116 0.123 
 (0.196) (0.117) (0.118) 
Mother's years of education -0.168 -0.065 -0.063 
 (0.105) (0.062) (0.062) 
Father's log monthly gross wage 0.346 0.159 0.057 
 (0.496) (0.213) (0.319) 
Instrumental variables MoB  
FUM 
MoB  
FUM  
FUM*Occ 
MoB  
FUM*Occ 
Father's occupation Yes Yes Yes 
Father's union membership No No Yes 
Observations 962 962 962 
Notes: Dependent variable takes the value 1 if the child reports wanting to go to university and 0 if he/she does not want to go to university. All models also 
include controls for student's gender, month and cohort of birth, ethnicity, number of siblings, parent's cohort of birth, father’s firm size, year and region fixed 
effects. MoB stands for month of birth and more specifically it is a variable that takes values from 1, if the parent is born in September, to 12 if the parent is born 
in August.. FUM is a dummy identifying father’s union membership; F.Occ represents dummies for father’s occupation. Heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors adjusted for clustering at primary sampling unit level are reported in parentheses. Symbols: *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * 
significant at 10% level. The sample is derived using the first wave of the UKHLS youth panel component and estimates are weighted using cross-sectional youth 
self-completion weights. 
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Table B3. Effects of parental education and income on child’s aspirations for higher education: UKHLS 2009-2012 
OLS REGRESSIONS 
Go to university(UKHLS) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Father's years of education 0.053***  0.043*** 0.034***  0.030** 0.034***  0.029** 
 (0.0118)  (0.0119) (0.0126)  (0.0125) (0.0126)  (0.0125) 
Mother's years of education -0.004  -0.006 -0.011  -0.010 -0.011  -0.010 
 (0.0126)  (0.0127) (0.0126)  (0.0126) (0.0126)  (0.0127) 
Father's log monthly gross wage  0.086*** 0.065***  0.056** 0.048**  0.055** 0.047** 
  (0.0210) (0.0217)  (0.0227) (0.0226)  (0.0228) (0.0227) 
Other White -0.002 0.020 -0.003 -0.005 0.005 -0.006 0.001 0.009 -0.002 
 (0.1254) (0.1185) (0.1247) (0.1257) (0.1204) (0.1250) (0.1265) (0.1211) (0.1257) 
Indian 0.120 0.128* 0.125* 0.160** 0.160** 0.156** 0.163** 0.163** 0.158** 
 (0.0769) (0.0721) (0.0750) (0.0795) (0.0756) (0.0774) (0.0797) (0.0757) (0.0776) 
Bangladeshi 0.252*** 0.339*** 0.325*** 0.269*** 0.328*** 0.318*** 0.271*** 0.328*** 0.318*** 
 (0.0658) (0.0714) (0.0720) (0.0723) (0.0751) (0.0751) (0.0718) (0.0747) (0.0748) 
Black African 0.016 0.023 0.018 -0.021 -0.012 -0.011 -0.022 -0.013 -0.012 
 (0.1012) (0.0860) (0.0925) (0.1084) (0.0989) (0.1025) (0.1081) (0.0985) (0.1023) 
Pakistani 0.120* 0.126* 0.140** 0.125* 0.126* 0.134* 0.130* 0.129* 0.138* 
 (0.0667) (0.0754) (0.0700) (0.0703) (0.0745) (0.0717) (0.0705) (0.0746) (0.0719) 
Black Caribbean 0.135*** 0.139*** 0.140*** 0.131*** 0.114** 0.125*** 0.132*** 0.115** 0.125*** 
 (0.0424) (0.0503) (0.0420) (0.0427) (0.0452) (0.0434) (0.0422) (0.0445) (0.0429) 
Mixed 0.012 -0.006 0.008 0.009 0.001 0.008 0.009 0.001 0.008 
 (0.0791) (0.0797) (0.0799) (0.0808) (0.0816) (0.0816) (0.0807) (0.0816) (0.0816) 
Other Ethnicity -0.101 -0.112 -0.106 -0.113 -0.123 -0.115 -0.112 -0.122 -0.114 
 (0.1123) (0.1160) (0.1124) (0.1066) (0.1090) (0.1071) (0.1072) (0.1095) (0.1075) 
Father's occupation No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Father's union membership No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N observations 1,026 1,026 1,026 1,026 1,026 1,026 1,026 1,026 1,026 
Notes: Dependent variable takes the value 1 if the child reports wanting to go to university and 0 if he/she does not want to go to university. All models also include 
controls for student's gender, month and cohort of birth, ethnicity, number of siblings, parent's cohort of birth, father’s firm size, year and region fixed effects. 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the primary sampling unit level are reported in parentheses. Symbols: *** significant at 1% level; 
** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. The sample is derived using the first wave of the UKHLS youth panel component including the ethnic minority 
boost. 
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Table BFS3. Effects of parental education and household income on child’s aspirations for higher education: UKHLS 2009- 2012 
FIRST STAGE IV REGRESSIONS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Father’s 
years of 
education 
Mother’s 
years of 
education 
Father’s log 
monthly 
gross wage 
Father’s 
years of 
education 
Mother’s 
years of 
education 
 Father’s log 
monthly 
gross wage 
Father’s 
years of 
education 
Mother’s 
years of 
education 
Father’s log 
monthly 
gross wage 
Father's Month of Birth -0.025** 0.010 -0.002 -0.029*** 0.006 -0.003 -0.029*** 0.006 -0.003 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) 
Mother's Month of Birth -0.003 -0.038*** 0.003 0.004 -0.038*** 0.005 0.004 -0.038*** 0.005 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.007) (0.011) (0.012) (0.007) (0.011) (0.012) (0.007) 
Father's Union Membership 0.061 -0.005 0.029 0.363 0.311 0.278***    
 (0.085) (0.099) (0.049) (0.237) (0.251) (0.087)    
Union*Professional    0.485* 0.637** 0.046 0.485* 0.637** 0.046 
    (0.287) (0.304) (0.109) (0.287) (0.304) (0.109) 
Union*Lower Professional    -0.329 -0.419 -0.100 -0.329 -0.419 -0.100 
    (0.298) (0.332) (0.122) (0.298) (0.332) (0.122) 
Union*Admin & Secretarial    -0.273 -0.785** -0.374 -0.273 -0.785** -0.374 
    (0.619) (0.373) (0.268) (0.619) (0.373) (0.268) 
Union*Skilled Trade    -0.794*** -0.662** -0.301** -0.794*** -0.662** -0.301** 
    (0.255) (0.330) (0.130) (0.255) (0.330) (0.130) 
Union*Personal Services    -0.666* -0.531 -0.842*** -0.666* -0.531 -0.842*** 
    (0.367) (0.402) (0.166) (0.367) (0.402) (0.166) 
Union*Machine Operatives    -0.998*** -0.524* -0.335*** -0.998*** -0.524* -0.335*** 
    (0.262) (0.282) (0.106) (0.262) (0.282) (0.106) 
Union*Elementary Occupations    -0.655* -0.981*** -0.645*** -0.655* -0.981*** -0.645*** 
    (0.357) (0.318) (0.164) (0.357) (0.318) (0.164) 
Weak id F-stat (father's education) 2.339   8.212   8.256   
Partial R-squared (father's education) 0.010   0.0710   0.0700   
Weak id F-stat (mother's education)  4.807   6.303   6.884  
Partial R-squared (mother's education)  0.023   0.070   0.070  
Weak id F-stat (household income)   1.440   5.567   5.930 
Partial R-squared (household income)   0.005   0.050   0.050 
Global weak id F-stat 0.103 1.906 2.118 
Notes: All models also include controls for student's gender, month of birth, ethnicity, number of siblings, parent's cohort of birth, father’s firm size, year and region 
fixed effects. MoB stands for month of birth and more specifically it is a variable that takes values from 1, if the parent is born in September, to 12 if the parent is born in 
August. FUM is a dummy identifying father’s union membership; F.Occ represents dummies for father’s occupation. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted 
for clustering at primary sampling unit level are reported in parentheses. Symbols: *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. The 
sample is derived using the first wave of the UKHLS youth panel component including the ethnic minority boost sample. 
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Table BIV3. Effects of parental education and household income on child’s aspirations for higher education: UKHLS 2009- 2012 
SECOND STAGE IV REGRESSIONS 
Go to university (UKHLS) (1) (2) (3) 
Father's years of education -0.208 0.152** 0.154** 
 (0.341) (0.065) (0.065) 
Mother's years of education -0.300 -0.025 -0.031 
 (0.315) (0.059) (0.060) 
Father's log monthly gross wage -0.678 0.025 0.020 
 (2.345) (0.138) (0.138) 
Instrumental variables MoB  
FUM 
MoB  
FUM  
FUM*Occ 
MoB  
FUM*Occ 
Father's occupation Yes Yes Yes 
Father's union membership No No Yes 
Observations 1,026 1,026 1,026 
Notes: Dependent variable takes the value 1 if the child reports wanting to go to university and 0 if he/she does not want to go to university. All models also 
include controls for student's gender, month and cohort of birth, ethnicity, number of siblings, parent's cohort of birth, father’s firm size, year and region fixed 
effects. MoB stands for month of birth and more specifically it is a variable that takes values from 1, if the parent is born in September, to 12 if the parent is born 
in August.. FUM is a dummy identifying father’s union membership; F.Occ represents dummies for father’s occupation. Heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors adjusted for clustering at primary sampling unit level are reported in parentheses. Symbols: *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * 
significant at 10% level. The sample is derived using the first wave of the UKHLS youth panel component including the ethnic minority boost sample. 
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Table B4. Effects of parental education and income on child’s aspirations for higher education: UKHLS 2009-2012 
OLS REGRESSIONS 
Go to university(UKHLS) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Father's years of education 0.057***  0.045*** 0.036***  0.030** 0.036***  0.030** 
 (0.0124)  (0.0126) (0.0133)  (0.0132) (0.0133)  (0.0132) 
Mother's years of education -0.003  -0.004 -0.009  -0.009 -0.009  -0.009 
 (0.0135)  (0.0136) (0.0133)  (0.0134) (0.0134)  (0.0134) 
Father's log monthly gross wage  0.100*** 0.077***  0.071*** 0.061**  0.070*** 0.061** 
  (0.0227) (0.0233)  (0.0246) (0.0246)  (0.0247) (0.0247) 
Other White -0.017 0.014 -0.010 -0.024 -0.008 -0.020 -0.019 -0.005 -0.017 
 (0.1215) (0.1185) (0.1228) (0.1208) (0.1181) (0.1212) (0.1216) (0.1188) (0.1220) 
Indian 0.141* 0.161** 0.155* 0.194** 0.204** 0.197** 0.197** 0.206** 0.199** 
 (0.0806) (0.0786) (0.0804) (0.0843) (0.0836) (0.0846) (0.0837) (0.0833) (0.0843) 
Bangladeshi 0.207*** 0.306*** 0.284*** 0.229*** 0.301*** 0.284*** 0.228*** 0.300*** 0.282*** 
 (0.0615) (0.0599) (0.0648) (0.0688) (0.0647) (0.0671) (0.0673) (0.0643) (0.0668) 
Black African 0.034 0.044 0.038 0.003 0.016 0.015 0.001 0.014 0.014 
 (0.0921) (0.0750) (0.0805) (0.0979) (0.0856) (0.0893) (0.0981) (0.0855) (0.0893) 
Pakistani 0.105* 0.107 0.127** 0.123* 0.121* 0.132** 0.127** 0.124* 0.135** 
 (0.0601) (0.0702) (0.0640) (0.0634) (0.0675) (0.0651) (0.0640) (0.0679) (0.0656) 
Black Caribbean 0.141*** 0.156*** 0.151*** 0.123*** 0.111** 0.118*** 0.123*** 0.111** 0.119*** 
 (0.0444) (0.0491) (0.0431) (0.0458) (0.0466) (0.0457) (0.0451) (0.0458) (0.0452) 
Mixed 0.048 0.024 0.042 0.052 0.038 0.048 0.052 0.039 0.048 
 (0.0889) (0.0908) (0.0909) (0.0911) (0.0919) (0.0921) (0.0914) (0.0921) (0.0923) 
Other Ethnicity -0.157 -0.147 -0.150 -0.159 -0.155 -0.152 -0.158 -0.154 -0.152 
 (0.1140) (0.1238) (0.1187) (0.1111) (0.1178) (0.1149) (0.1116) (0.1182) (0.1153) 
Father's occupation No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Father's union membership No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N observations 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 
Notes: Dependent variable takes the value 1 if the child reports wanting to go to university and 0 if he/she does not want to go to university. All models also include 
controls for student's gender, month and cohort of birth, ethnicity, number of siblings, parent's cohort of birth, father’s firm size, year and region fixed effects. 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the primary sampling unit level are reported in parentheses. Symbols: *** significant at 1% level; 
** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. The sample is derived using the first wave of the UKHLS youth panel component including the ethnic minority 
boost and estimates are weighted using cross-sectional youth self-completion weights. 
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Table BFS4. Effects of parental education and household income on child’s aspirations for higher education: UKHLS 2009- 2012 
FIRST STAGE IV REGRESSIONS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Father’s 
years of 
education 
Mother’s 
years of 
education 
Father’s log 
monthly 
gross wage 
Father’s 
years of 
education 
Mother’s 
years of 
education 
 Father’s log 
monthly 
gross wage 
Father’s 
years of 
education 
Mother’s 
years of 
education 
Father’s log 
monthly 
gross wage 
Father's Month of Birth -0.023** 0.010 0.001 -0.027** 0.006 -0.001 -0.027** 0.006 -0.001 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011) (0.010) (0.006) (0.011) (0.010) (0.006) 
Mother's Month of Birth -0.004 -0.043*** 0.003 0.002 -0.044*** 0.005 0.002 -0.044*** 0.005 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.006) (0.011) (0.012) (0.006) (0.011) (0.012) (0.006) 
Father's Union Membership 0.034 -0.020 0.007 0.330 0.297 0.279***    
 (0.084) (0.102) (0.048) (0.239) (0.267) (0.086)    
Union*Professional    0.457 0.672** 0.058 0.457 0.672** 0.058 
    (0.299) (0.317) (0.102) (0.299) (0.317) (0.102) 
Union*Lower Professional    -0.254 -0.482 -0.145 -0.254 -0.482 -0.145 
    (0.302) (0.344) (0.121) (0.302) (0.344) (0.121) 
Union*Admin & Secretarial    -0.232 -0.785** -0.327 -0.232 -0.785** -0.327 
    (0.646) (0.349) (0.254) (0.646) (0.349) (0.254) 
Union*Skilled Trade    -0.792*** -0.676** -0.324*** -0.792*** -0.676** -0.324*** 
    (0.257) (0.341) (0.125) (0.257) (0.341) (0.125) 
Union*Personal Services    -0.631* -0.420 -0.809*** -0.631* -0.420 -0.809*** 
    (0.361) (0.419) (0.162) (0.361) (0.419) (0.162) 
Union*Machine Operatives    -1.019*** -0.528* -0.374*** -1.019*** -0.528* -0.374*** 
    (0.263) (0.294) (0.105) (0.263) (0.294) (0.105) 
Union*Elementary Occupations    -0.784** -0.926*** -0.660*** -0.784** -0.926*** -0.660*** 
    (0.354) (0.336) (0.171) (0.354) (0.336) (0.171) 
Weak id F-stat (father's education) 1.973   7.936   7.530   
Partial R-squared (father's education) 0.009   0.074   0.072   
Weak id F-stat (mother's education)  5.871   6.762   7.333  
Partial R-squared (mother's 
education) 
 0.029   0.076   0.076  
Weak id F-stat (household income)   1.313   6.290   6.685 
Partial R-squared (household income)   0.005   0.052   0.052 
Global weak id F-stat 0.00127 2.011 2.176 
Notes: All models also include controls for student's gender, month of birth, ethnicity, number of siblings, parent's cohort of birth, father’s firm size, year and region 
fixed effects. MoB stands for month of birth and more specifically it is a variable that takes values from 1, if the parent is born in September, to 12 if the parent is born in 
August. FUM is a dummy identifying father’s union membership; F.Occ represents dummies for father’s occupation. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted 
for clustering at primary sampling unit level are reported in parentheses. Symbols: *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. The 
60 
 
sample is derived using the first wave of the UKHLS youth panel component, including the ethnic minority boost sample, and estimates are weighted using cross-
sectional youth self-completion weights. 
 
Table BIV4. Effects of parental education and household income on child’s aspirations for higher education: UKHLS 2009- 2012 
SECOND STAGE IV REGRESSIONS 
Go to university (UKHLS) (1) (2) (3) 
Father's years of education 0.701 0.164** 0.169** 
 (12.815) (0.071) (0.073) 
Mother's years of education 0.706 -0.058 -0.064 
 (14.342) (0.058) (0.061) 
Father's log monthly gross wage 11.472 0.061 0.053 
 (176.611) (0.153) (0.154) 
Instrumental variables MoB  
FUM 
MoB  
FUM  
FUM*Occ 
MoB  
FUM*Occ 
Father's occupation Yes Yes Yes 
Father's union membership No No Yes 
Observations 1,020 1,020 1,020 
Notes: Dependent variable takes the value 1 if the child reports wanting to go to university and 0 if he/she does not want to go to university. All models also 
include controls for student's gender, month and cohort of birth, ethnicity, number of siblings, parent's cohort of birth, father’s firm size, year and region fixed 
effects. MoB stands for month of birth and more specifically it is a variable that takes values from 1, if the parent is born in September, to 12 if the parent is born 
in August.. FUM is a dummy identifying father’s union membership; F.Occ represents dummies for father’s occupation. Heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors adjusted for clustering at primary sampling unit level are reported in parentheses. Symbols: *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * 
significant at 10% level. The sample is derived using the first wave of the UKHLS youth panel component, including the ethnic minority boost sample, and 
estimates are weighted using cross-sectional youth self-completion weights. 
 
 
